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This study describes the newly created FEEM-Monitor Sovereign Wealth Fund Database and 
discusses the investment patterns and performance achieved for 1,216 individual investments, 
worth over $357 billion, made by 28 sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) between January 1986 and 
September 2008. We document large SWF investments in listed and unlisted equity, real estate, 
and private equity funds, with the bulk of investments being targeted in cross-border acquisitions 
of sizeable but non-controlling stakes in operating companies and commercial properties. The 
average (median) SWF investment is a $441 million ($55 million) acquisition of a 42.3% (26.2%) 
stake in an unlisted American, British, or Singaporean company, made by a SWF from Singapore 
or the United Arab Emirates in June 2005. Almost one-third (30.9%) of the number, and over half 
of the value (54.6%) of SWF investments are directed toward financial firms. The vast majority of 
SWF investments involve privately-negotiated purchases of ownership stakes, with only 23 deals 
worth $677 million being listed as open market purchases of stock in listed firms. We also perform 
an event study using a sample of 235 SWF acquisitions of equity stakes in publicly traded 
companies around the world, and document a significantly positive mean abnormal return of 
about 0.9% around the announcement date. However, one-year risk-adjusted abnormal returns of 
SWFs average a significantly negative 26%, suggesting equity acquisitions by SWFs are followed by 
deteriorating firm performance. SWFs have collectively lost over $98 billion—fully 78% of original 
value—on their holdings of listed stock investments alone through February 2009. 
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Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns And Performance 
 
Perhaps it should be called the “return of state capitalism.” However phrased, recent times have 
seen the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as major international investors and the focus of 
global media and political attention. These funds now control over US$3 trillion in assets and have 
demonstrated an ability to both calm and roil international financial markets. SWFs first entered popular 
discourse during spring 2007, when a Chinese state-owned investment company purchased a $3 billion, 
non-voting  equity  stake  in  Blackstone  Group  immediately  prior  to  the  group’s  highly  touted  (but 
subsequently under-performing) initial public offering. Later that same year, and again in early 2008, 
SWFs surged to the forefront of financial policy discussions when several, mostly Persian Gulf-based 
SWFs effectively,  if only  temporarily,  rescued  the western banking  system  by  purchasing  some  $60 
billion worth of newly issued stock in top American and European banks at the height of the subprime 
mortgage crisis. These episodes highlighted both the sheer financial firepower that SWFs now control and 
just how dependent on them western financial economies have become, and vice versa. Unfortunately, the 
losses these funds have suffered on their listed equity investments—which exceed $98 billion, or 78% of 
original purchase price, as of late February 2009—also suggest that the financial crisis has hit sovereign 
wealth funds especially hard.  
The term “Sovereign Wealth Fund” was coined only four years ago, by Razanov (2005), and no 
consensus has yet been reached on its exact meaning, but most definitions suggest these are state-owned 
investment funds (not operating companies) that make long-term domestic and international investments 
in search of commercial returns. Some definitions are much narrower than this, as in Truman (2007a), 
who defines a sovereign wealth fund as “a pool of domestic and international assets owned and managed 
by governments to achieve a variety of economic and financial objectives, including the accumulation and 
management  of  reserve  assets,  the  stabilization  of macroeconomic  effects  and  the  transfer  of  wealth 
across  generations.”
1  On  the  other  hand,  Balding  (2008)  shows  that  more  expansive  definitions 
encompassing government-run pension funds, development banks, and other investment vehicles would 
yield a truly spectacular total value of “sovereign wealth.” We adopt a fairly narrow definition of SWF 
and create our sample using the listing of funds specified by the Monitor Group.   
Sovereign wealth fund investment is not a new phenomenon and many of the largest funds—such 
as Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), the world’s largest SWF, and Singapore’s Government 
                                                           
1 Unlike other commentators, Truman (2007) includes government pension funds in the SWF category. Most others 
exclude government pension plans, with the notable exception of Norway’s Government Pension Plan, which is 
“shoe-horned” into the definition because its size, its unusual global asset allocation, and its focus on profitability 
make it more similar to other SWFs than to other government pension plans. In addition, most definitions exclude 
funds directly managed by central banks, as those often have very different priorities, such as currency stabilization, 
funding of specific development projects, or the development of specific economic sectors.   
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Investment Corporation (GIC) and Temasek--have been actively and successfully investing around the 
world for decades, attracting little attention. Only recently have SWFs become the subject of intense 
interest by the press, by politicians and by institutions. The first time that international investment by a 
state-owned company aroused controversy in the United States was in 2005, when the Chinese National 
Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) attempted to purchase Unocal, only to be blocked by opposition from 
the U.S Congress. One year later, popular opposition expressed through Congress again scuttled the 
acquisition of a major U.S. operating company by a foreign state-owned enterprise, this time Dubai World 
Ports’ purchase of operating rights to six key port facilities. Ironically, neither of these foreign companies 
was a SWF, yet their actions fueled the popular backlash against acquisitions of western companies by 
state-owned  entities.  This  backlash  prompted  equally  intense  annoyance  (and  at  least  feigned 
bewilderment) on the part of the funds themselves, since they profess purely investment objectives and 
argue (correctly) that no significant example of politically motivated, non-commercial SWF investment 
has ever been documented.  
Notably, academia has been much slower to react to the rise of sovereign funds, to the extent that 
the first draft of our study was the first true empirical analysis of SWF investment patterns we are aware 
of—though other studies have been presented over the past year (summarized below). We survey the 
main SWF-related topics recently discussed in the press and in extant corporate finance research and 
document that most of the published articles have indeed assumed negative tones, often without much 
theoretical or empirical support.
2 In particular, the most commonly raised concern regards the potentially 
politicized nature of sovereign fund investment.
3 Paradoxically, the popular concern over SWFs appears 
in  direct  contrast  with  a  large  body  of  academic  literature  (surveyed  below)  which  predicts  that 
investments by large institutional shareholders will have a positive impact on firm profitability. Shleifer 
and  Vishny  (1986)  present  a  theory  of  the  relationship  between  shareholder  size  and  corporate 
governance.  In  particular,  they  point  to  the  fact  that  small  shareholders  lack  incentives  to  monitor 
managerial performance and they relate this to a free-rider problem. They suggest that the presence of 
large shareholders offers a partial solution to the free-rider problem and greatly improves monitoring, 
since large shareholders have much stronger monitoring incentives. Since SWFs are large institutional 
shareholders likely to acquire sizable stakes, this theory predicts an increase in the value of equity of 
companies in which SWFs acquire a significant equity stake.  
                                                           
2 For example, see Lawrence Summers, “Sovereign Wealth Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism”, Financial Times, 
July 30, 2007. 
3  For  example,  see  Steven  R.  Weisman,  “Concern  about  ‘Sovereign  Wealth  Funds’  Spreads  to  Washington”, 
International Herald Tribune, August 20, 2007 and Krishna Guha, “Warning over Sovereign Wealth Funds”, The 
Financial Times, June 22, 2007.  
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On the other hand, concerns echoed by both regulators and by market participants find support in 
the agency cost theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency cost theory predicts that large 
investors might force the company to act in their own interest and against the interests of other investors, 
employees or managers. Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990), Barclay and Holderness (1992) and Zingales 
(1994), among others, empirically test and find support for large shareholders imposing agency costs on 
firms. SWFs are particularly likely to impose agency costs on acquired firms, since as state-owned funds 
their motives might not always be consistent with risk-adjusted profit maximization. In addition, by virtue 
of their lack of transparency, they could impose agency costs simply because of uncertainty about their 
behavior as shareholders, causing a decrease in the value of target firm equity.  
Using a combined sample of 1,216 investments by SWFs in companies and commercial property 
around  the  world,  we  examine  investment  patterns  exhibited  by  these  funds  and  test  whether  their 
investments have been value-increasing or decreasing. We find that, contrary to perceptions, these funds 
almost always purchase minority stakes directly from target companies, roughly half of which are unlisted 
and are often located in the fund’s home country. SWFs disproportionately favor financial companies, 
targeting about one-third of all their investments by number—and over 50% by value--in this sector. We 
also investigate whether the market correctly anticipates the potential impact of SWF investments on 
target firms. We believe it to be of particular interest to examine if the market is correctly pricing the 
effect  of  SWF  investments,  or  whether  it  is  reacting  to  irrational  fears  echoed  by  the  press  and  by 
regulators. We find stocks of companies receiving SWF equity investments increase significantly, by 
about 0.9%, on the announcement of these investments, suggesting that investors welcome SWFs as 
shareholders. On the other hand, we also find that abnormal buy-and-hold returns on shares of equity of 
firms targeted by SWFs average -26% over one year. While we expect such an effect to be stronger the 
larger the share of equity acquired by the SWF, and to depend on the fund’s transparency and governance, 
in a cross sectional study we find only weak evidence supporting this expectation. We conclude that 
SWFs typically purchase stakes in underperforming companies and that this underperformance persists 
for at least a year following the SWF investment.  
The  present study  adds to  the  literature  on  the impact of large  institutional  shareholders,  by 
providing  new  evidence  regarding  the  benefits  associated  with  better  monitoring  and  the  additional 
agency costs they impose. In addition, it sheds some light on the potential impact of SWF investments on 
listed companies, which should be of great interest to both market participants and market regulators.  
This manuscript is structured as follows. Section I describes the evolution of sovereign wealth 
funds  from  small  stabilization  funds  to  their  emergence  as  kingmakers  of  global  finance.  Section  II 
describes the FEEM-Monitor Sovereign Wealth Fund Database we created for this study, while Section 
III  presents  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  investment  patterns  exhibited  by  SWFs,  individually  and  
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collectively.  Section  IV  presents  our  empirical  results:  our  analysis  of  market  reactions  at  the 
announcement of acquisitions by SWFs, the long-term analysis of the impact of SWF acquisitions and the 
results of our regression analyses of the announcement-period and long-run returns. Section V concludes.  
 
I.   The Evolution of Sovereign Wealth Funds—From Stabilization to Wealth Preservation 
 
As previously mentioned, the descriptive term “sovereign wealth fund” has been coined only 
recently [Razanov (2005)]. Previously, those funds were often labeled “stabilization funds.” While SWFs 
are a heterogeneous phenomenon, most share common origins; in the majority of cases, SWFs are an 
evolution of funds whose principal initial purpose was revenue stabilization. That is, governments whose 
revenue streams are dependent on the value of one underlying commodity have engaged in diversification 
of investments with the goal of stabilizing revenues. Accordingly, most SWFs have been established in 
countries that are rich in natural resources, with oil-related SWFs being the most common ones (in the 
case of Arab Gulf countries, ex-Soviet republics and Norway), but other sources of funding include 
diamonds, copper and other raw materials in a few African and South-American countries. A second 
category of SWF relates to the accumulation of foreign currency as a result of substantial net exports, 
especially in the cases of China, Singapore and other East-Asian exporters. Nonetheless, there is no real 
consensus on exactly what constitutes a sovereign wealth fund, and, depending on the definition, the total 
value of assets under management can vary widely.  
Truman  (2007a,  2007b)  offers  a  review  of  the  history  of  SWFs.  The  first  such  fund  was 
established by Kiribati, a tiny Pacific island nation, to manage revenues from phosphate deposits (guano). 
A large number of those funds were established during the 1970s, as rising oil prices led to a build-up of 
oil export revenues. While few SWFs were launched in the 1980s and 1990s, at least a dozen new funds 
have been established since 2000. Since, as noted above, consensus has not yet been reached on the exact 
definition of a SWF, estimates of the total size of SWFs vary widely as well. By reliable estimates, SWFs 
managed approximately US$ 3 trillion of assets in early 2008, with a recent authoritative estimate by 
International Financial Services London giving a figure of $3.3 trillion.
4 Today’s total asset value is 
doubtless significantly lower; although no published study has presented comprehensive estimates of the 
losses SWFs have suffered over the past year on all their investments, our own research documents losses 
exceeding $98 billion on SWF investments in listed equities alone, as of late February 2009.  
                                                           
4 See John Willman, 2008, “Sovereign Wealth Funds Grow to $3,300bn,” Financial Times (March 30 2008), from 
the www.ft.com website. As noted, the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, which uses a more inclusive definition of 
SWFs, gives their total size as US$3.927 trillion as of October 2008.  
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The sheer size of SWFs, while making them an important player in markets, has to be evaluated 
with respect to other investment vehicles. The aggregate size of SWFs  estimated by Lyons (2007), US$ 
2.1 trillion in early 2007, is still much smaller than the aggregate assets of either pension funds (circa US$ 
21 trillion) or mutual funds (circa US$ 17 trillion), but larger than the aggregate size of all hedge funds (at 
about US$ 1.5 trillion) and private equity funds. Lyons (2007) also offers an interesting comparison of the 
size of individual SWFs to that of other asset management funds, many of which dwarf even ADIA, the 
largest sovereign fund. One list of SWFs, including estimates of their size in 2008, compiled by the SWF 
Institute, is reproduced in Table 1. 
*** Insert Table 1 about here**** 
In recent years, a combination of trends has led to a very rapid accumulation of reserves in 
sovereign funds. The most relevant trends include rising oil prices, but also rising prices for other raw 
materials (often attributed to China’s fast economic growth) and the negative balance of payments of 
Western  countries,  especially  the  United  States,  which  has  inflated  the  currency  reserves  of  Asian 
exporters  (particularly  dollar-denominated  reserves). Swelling  reserves  have  been  coupled  with  other 
trends. On one side, aging populations have led to a desire for higher returns, in anticipation of increased 
pension  liabilities  and, in  response,  governments  have  searched  for  new  investment  options  offering 
potentially higher returns. On the other hand, a series of factors has made international investments less 
problematic. In particular, Truman (2007a) cites “increased global integration, substantial elimination of 
restrictions on international capital flows, technological innovation, […] recognition that diversification 
contributes  to  increased  investment  returns,  loosening  of  ‘home  bias’  in  investment  decisions.”  Fast 
accumulation of reserves, coupled with a swelling appetite for returns, has led to a dramatic increase in 
the rate of acquisitions.
5 Recognizing that the actual growth rates are going to be extremely sensitive to 
macroeconomic factors, in particular the price of oil, Jen (2007a) estimates that SWFs will grow in the 
next decade at around US$40 billion per year, concluding that the pool of assets managed by SWFs could 
reach US$12 trillion by 2015 (Jen 2007b). Jen recently scaled back his forecast of SWFs’ growth rate to 
reflect the impact of sharply lower asset valuations—following the credit crisis of late 2008 and the 
collapse of bank stock values—and declining oil prices (that reduce the funding available to Persian Gulf-
based funds). 
In political terms, recent interest is apparent. Examples include the 2006 purchase by Temasek 
Holdings, a Singaporean SWF, of a stake in a company owned by the prime minister of Thailand. The 
                                                           
5 In fact, our sample shows very clearly that SWF investments surged after 2001, and grew especially rapidly from 
2005 until the summer of 2008, when oil prices peaked. In fact, almost 60 percent of the 1,216 SWF investments we 
analyze occurred after December 2004. After the second quarter of 2008, however, investments by SWFs fell 




subsequent demonstrations were so vocal they led to the ousting of the prime minister a few months later 
in a military coup. Political opposition is exemplified by Chancellor Angela Merkel who, in June 2007, 
publicly complained about Russian SWFs buying pipelines and energy infrastructure in Europe. With 
SWFs growing rapidly in size and scope, the global political outcry is likely to grow even louder. Nor is 
the political debate limited to countries being targeted by SWFs as possible investment locations; earlier 
in 2007, the Chinese press very vocally (by Chinese standards) criticized the purchase of a ten percent 
stake in Blackstone, which has since led to substantial paper losses. Political interest is also exemplified 
by a recent surge of discussions regarding SWFs in the US Congress.  
Despite the hyper-ventilation surrounding SWFs, however, a more sober analysis suggests these 
funds are much less threatening to the established global financial order than is generally perceived, for 
several reasons. First, as Balding (2008) makes clear, SWFs allocate their investments among different 
asset classes in much the same way as do other financial intermediaries, with well over half of all assets 
invested  in  fixed  income  securities  (foreign  and  domestic),  another  sizeable  fraction  invested  in 
commercial  real  estate,  and  most  of  the  rest  invested  in  domestic  equities.  Therefore,  the  type  of 
investment that most excites western observers—international purchases of large stakes in publicly listed 
western operating companies--is actually a fairly minor sideline activity for established SWFs, and has 
become even less important in the wake of the financial crisis. Second, the funds that western policy-
makers seem to fear the most, Russia’s Stabilization Fund and the China Investment Corporation (CIC), 
are among the most conservatively managed and most domestically focused of all the major funds. Third, 
the vast majority of funds are established to be quite distinct from the political arms of the sponsoring 
governments, principally to ensure their independence from politically-motivated budgetary pressures, but 
also to ensure at least some freedom from political interference. Finally, the funds are actually extremely 
lean organizations, with employee head-counts typically numbering in the dozens rather than thousands, 
and so the funds would be hard pressed to pursue a politically motivated investment agenda, even if they 
wished to. In fact, the major funds often refuse invitations to join the boards of companies in which they 
invest, and many SWFs deliberately purchase non-voting shares. 
 
A.  Sovereign Wealth Funds – Recent Interest 
During 2007 and the first half of 2008, the popular press and the general public became extremely 
active in discussing the potential impact of SWFs.
6 For the most part, the press depicted SWFs in negative 
tones, and most of the debate focused on the perceived problems associated with the growth of SWFs. 
The issues that were raised included the possibility that SWF assets could be used to further political 
                                                           
6 A search of the Financial Times website (www.ft.com) on December 31, 2008 yielded 2,524 hits, just for the string 
“sovereign wealth funds”, and all since May 19, 2007—the date when FT first used the term in an article.  
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purposes and target strategic acquisitions
7, the risk of equity price bubbles due to the sheer size of their 
investments
8 and the related decline in demand for Treasury bonds
9, the risk of an increase in volatility of 
financial markets
10 , the possibility that SWFs might have a detrimental effect on corporate governance 
because of political motives or lack of sophistication
11 and, finally, the risk of the emergence of a new 
form of financial protectionism as a reaction to SWFs.
12 Ironically, in the wake of the 2008 collapse in 
global equity values, western criticism of SWFs became much more muted, though many of the concerns 
described above will doubtless re-emerge if and when markets revive and the funds once more become 
active international investors. 
  By far the most enduring criticism of sovereign funds has been their lack of transparency, which is 
unquestionably true.
13 Aside from a few notable exceptions (principally the Norwegian pension and oil 
stabilization funds), SWFs have been extremely reluctant to disclose any information about their 
investment policies or returns. Consequently, there is broad agreement that SWFs should become more 
transparent and disclose their strategies and holdings—and there is some evidence that this is occurring. 
In February 2008, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) sent a letter to regulators in key countries 
specifying what its investment policies will be and promising greater disclosure. More substantively, an 
agreement on general principles and practices that should guide SWF investments, collectively called the 
Santiago Principles, was reached between western nations and the most important SWFs in September 
2008. These principles are presented and described in (http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm).  
The potential benefits of SWF investments generally received much less attention—at least until 
these investments dried up following the Crash and the post-July 2008 collapse in oil prices. The most 
often cited benefit is an expected increase in liquidity of financial markets, especially in the private equity 
industry.
14 As Lesmond (2005) makes clear, the liquidity of emerging market financial systems is often 
quite limited, so improving market liquidity appears to be an important SWF contribution. 
While academia has been slow to react to this renewed interest in SWFs, corporate research on 
the topic has recently started to emerge. As noted previously, Razanov (2005) offers the first definition of 
                                                           
7 For example, see Lawrence Summers, “Sovereign Wealth Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism”, The Financial 
Times, July 30, 2007 and Steven R. Weisman, “Concern about ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Spreads to Washington”, 
International Herald Tribune, August 20, 2007.   
8 Satoshi Kambayashi, “The World’s Most Expensive Club”, the Economist, May 24, 2007.  
9 David J. Lynch, “U.S.: Secretive Global Funds May Hurt Treasuries Market”, USA Today, June 21, 2007.  
10 Krishna Guha, “Warning over Sovereign Wealth Funds”, the Financial Times, June 22, 2007.  
11 Steven R. Weisman, “Concern about ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Spreads to Washington”, International Herald 
Tribune, August 20, 2007.   
12  Michael  R.  Sesit,  “Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  are  Starting  to  Dominate  Global  Finance”,  International  Herald 
Tribune, June 18, 2007 and Lynch, David J., “U.S.: Secretive Global Funds May Hurt Treasuries Market”, USA 
Today, June 21, 2007. 
13 David Simonds, “China Takes the Bank”, the Economist, July 26, 2007. 
14 Lina Saigol, “Banks Rush to Form SWF Teams”, The Financial Times, September 2, 2007. Also see Lina Saigol, 
“Banks Rush to Form SWF Teams”, The Financial Times, September 2, 2007.  
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the term “Sovereign Wealth Fund,” claiming that SWFs “are neither traditional public-pension funds nor 
reserve  assets supporting national  currencies,”  but funds set  up  with  one  or more  of  the  following 
objectives:  “insulate  the  budget  and  economy  from  excess  volatility  in  revenues,  help  monetary 
authorities sterilize unwanted liquidity, build up savings for future generations, or use the money for 
economic and social development”. Razanov points out that most of those funds are not new, but he 
justifies the renewed interest by an increase in the number of SWFs around the world, by their rapid asset 
accumulation, and by the sheer size of those funds.  In addition, Razanov lists the major SWFs and 
attempts to estimate the size of each; cumulatively, he estimates the total asset pool managed by SWFs to 
be at least $895 billion (in 2005). In a subsequent article (Razanov, 2007), the author claims that the most 
important step in designing a fund is defining its liability profile. Accordingly, he classifies SWFs in five 
categories: stabilization/buffer funds, endowment funds, pension reserve funds, development funds and 
government holding funds. Yet, he does recognize that “stabilization funds are a class of their own and 
stand  out  compared  to  all  other  fund  types.  The  reason  is  that,  while  all  other  funds  are  managed 
primarily  for  long-term  return  and  wealth  maximization,  stabilization  funds  have  as  their  primary 
objective  risk  management”.  While  a  formal  definition  of  SWFs  does  not  yet  exist,  nowadays  the 
consensus seems to be to exclude stabilization funds from the broad SWF category.  
More  recently,  descriptive  papers  by  the  Monitor  Group  [Miracky,  Dyer,  Fisher,  Goldner, 
Lagarde, and Piedrahita (2008)], the European Central Bank [Beck and Fidora (2008)], and Subacchi 
(2008) assess the rise of SWFs, and reach generally positive, if nuanced conclusions. Butt, Shivdasani, 
Stendevad and Wyman (2008) offer an interesting description of the SWF phenomenon, summarizing the 
salient features of SWFs and echoing the most common concerns, while Blundell-Wignall, Hy and Yermo 
(2008)  offer  a  brief  description  of  SWFs,  focusing  on  the  differences  between  the  latter  and  public 
pension funds. Monk (2008) assesses how the rise of SWFs as a financial and political force is straining 
the existing international economic order, while Gilson and Milhaupt (2008) describe how SWFs fit into 
the increasing trend toward direct government involvement in corporate activity, which they label the 
New Mercantilism. Finally, Balding (2008) offers a portfolio analysis of several of the largest SWFs, and 
insightfully discusses how difficult accurately categorizing SWFs can be. 
Since we have made public a first draft of the present paper, a handful of academic studies have 
addressed the same topic. Kotter and Lel (2008) analyze a sample of 163 SWF investment announcements 
between 1982 and 2008. They find that the market reacts positively to announcements of investments by 
SWFs. They also find that transparency of the fund is related to the market reaction at the time of the 
announcement, but they document that SWF investments do not significantly affect target firm growth, 
profitability or governance in the three years following the investment. Dewenter, Han and Malatesta 
(2008) analyze a sample of 196 acquisitions and 47 divestitures by SWFs involving publicly traded firms.  
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They find positive market reactions to acquisitions and negative reactions to divestitures. In a long-term 
analysis, they find mostly insignificant, slightly negative abnormal returns. In cross-sectional analysis, 
they find that an overall index of fund governance is positively related to the announcement reaction and 
that the relationship between abnormal returns and percent acquired is non-linear: small acquisitions lead 
to positive reactions while large acquisitions lead to smaller, even negative reactions.  
Knill, Lee and Mauck (2009) similarly analyze a sample of 232 SWF investments in publicly 
traded companies.  They find positive market reactions to announcements. For the long-term (one-year) 
event studies, they offer different results by subsets. They find negative one-year abnormal returns, but 
only  for SWFs that are from oil-producing  countries,  for  opaque  SWFs  and  for  investments in  non-
financial  targets.  They  also  find  stronger  negative  returns  following  heavy  media-coverage.  Yet,  the 
authors are mostly interested in studying market volatility. In order to investigate  whether SWFs add 
instability, as often claimed by the press, or produce stability by allowing a larger investor-base, the 
authors  then  estimate  an  autoregressive  volatility  model.  Their  results  document  lower  volatility  for 
targets after acquisitions. They also compute Sharpe ratios and find that the decline in returns is not 
compensated by sufficiently lower volatility. Finally, they repeat their analysis for the target home market 
and claim that target markets display lower returns and volatility after SWF investments. An analysis of 
profitability ratios leads to similar results as the above for individual firms - that is, both returns and 
volatility are lower, but the decline in volatility is not enough to compensate.   
Another study focusing on SWF transaction is Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008). These authors 
investigate investment patterns by SWFs and find that the funds largely invest to diversify away from 
industries at home, but they do so by investing mainly in countries sharing the same culture. In an event 
study on a sample of 89 investment transactions, they find positive market reactions at the time of the 
announcement, but they find poor long-run performance of investment targets. Finally, Fernandes (2009) 
takes a different approach, by focusing on SWF holdings, rather than transactions. Using data on over 
21,000 SWF holdings between 2002 and 2007, he finds that firms with higher SWF ownership have 
higher valuations and better operating performance. He also documents that SWFs have a stabilizing 
effect on financial markets.  
  The main advantage of our study lies in our dataset; our study is based on the largest transaction 
sample and, by describing the latter, we offer important insights into SWF investment patterns. Also, 
unlike most of the above-cited works, we exclude pension funds from our analysis, thereby obtaining 
more relevant results.  
 
B.  Large Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance  
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One of the concerns commonly expressed regarding SWFs is the potential impact they may have 
on corporate governance. In particular, it has been noted that many SWFs originate from oil rich countries 
and  from  Asian  exporters.  With  some  exceptions,  both  categories  are  dominated  by  countries  with 
relatively undeveloped financial markets and institutions. Accordingly, it has been questioned whether 
SWF managers are sophisticated enough to properly exercise their role as shareholders, both in terms of 
voting and in terms of monitoring. The only direct objection to the argument is brought by Kern (2007), 
as he claims that most SWFs are managed by very sophisticated teams which are, according to the author, 
likely to improve corporate governance.  
  While academic literature has not so far addressed the impact of SWFs on corporate governance, 
there is a large body of research focusing on the effect of large institutional shareholders on the latter. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) survey prior theory and empirical evidence on corporate governance, and two 
sections of their survey deal specifically with the impact of large shareholders. They conclude that large 
shareholders generally do improve monitoring of managers, but also introduce new agency costs, as they 
have incentives to expropriate both minority shareholders and creditors. 
  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a theory of the relationship between shareholder size and 
corporate  governance.  In  particular,  they  point  to  the  fact  that  small  shareholders  lack  incentives  to 
monitor  managerial  performance  and  they  relate  this  to  a  free-rider  problem.  They  suggest  that  the 
presence of large shareholders would offer a partial solution to the free-rider problem and could greatly 
improve monitoring.  Shivdasani (1993) offers the first empirical evidence for the theory presented in 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1986)  by  showing  that,  in  US  corporations,  large  shareholders  increase  the 
likelihood of a hostile takeover. Kaplan and Minton (1994) focus on Japanese firms and find that those 
with large shareholders are more likely to replace managers in case of poor performance. Their results are 
confirmed by a similar study by Kang and Shivdasani (1995). Denis and Serrano (1996) collect data on 
US corporations and conclude that the likelihood of a change in management after a defeated takeover 
attempt  is  higher in  poorly  performing  companies  with  large  shareholders. Gillan  and  Starks  (1998) 
present a survey on the literature and empirical evidence regarding the impact of shareholder activism by 
both individuals and institutional investors. They conclude that, while some short-term market reaction 
has been documented, there is little evidence of improvements in long-term operating or stock-market 
performance. Similar results are documented in Klein and Zur (2007) and Li, Moshirian, Pham, and Zein 
(2006). Gillan and Starks (2000) focus on proposals by both individual and institutional investors, and 
find that success of proposals depends on sponsor identity, issue type, prior performance and time period. 
They document weak market reactions, highly dependent on the sponsor.  Active individual investors 
receive less support for proposals, but their proposals cause small positive market reactions. Proposals by  
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active institutional investors receive more support and are more likely to be adopted, but are associated 
with small, negative market reactions.  
  As do most of the articles in the corporate governance literature, the papers surveyed above focus 
on the beneficial impact of large investors on corporate governance, but several other studies point to the 
costs associated with large institutional shareholders. Theoretical arguments focus on two main sources of 
costs.  First,  Demsetz  and  Lehn  (1985)  hypothesize  and  find  that  large  investors  are  not  sufficiently 
diversified  and  thus  aim  for  an  excessive  reduction  of  company-specific  risk,  forcing  companies  to 
become excessively conservative. Subsequent empirical studies have confirmed their findings. A second 
problem is associated with the risk that large investors will force the company to act in their own interest, 
against the interests of other investors, employees or managers. The theory regarding conflicts of interest 
and the related agency costs relates to Jensen and Meckling (1976). A few papers have examined the 
latter issue by focusing on premiums paid for the acquisition of large blocs of shares, with the underlying 
hypothesis being that this premium reflects additional value created through ownership of a large portion 
of  the  company.  Bergstrom  and  Rydqvist  (1990)  focus  on  Sweden  and  find  no  such  premiums, 
concluding that there is no strong evidence for expropriation of small shareholders by large blockholders. 
Barclay and Holderness (1989) analyze the pricing of block trades of common stock of NYSE and Amex 
corporations, and find that these blocks are priced at an average premium of 20%, but their sample 
includes only 63 trades concentrated in the years 1978-1982. Dyck and Zingales (2004) clearly document 
widely varying, but economically highly significant private benefits of control in many national markets. 
Barclay and Holderness (1992) re-examine this topic with a larger sample of 106 trades between 1978 and 
1982. Their empirical findings confirm the existence of a large-block premium, yet the authors observe 
that minority shareholders receive the same price per share in a merger or tender offer as large block 
holders, suggesting that minority holders benefit as well. They conclude that no value is transferred from 
small shareholders to large blockholders. Zingales (1994) estimates the value of the voting premium on 
the Milan stock exchange; observing that the premium is larger than the one observed in US-based stock 
markets, he concludes that the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders is larger in Italy.  
A handful of studies have examined the issue of costs and benefits of having large shareholders 
by focusing on the link between shareholder concentration and firm performance. Stulz (1988) presents a 
model of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Based on his model, 
higher ownership concentration leads to higher profitability, because of reduced agency costs. However, 
as ownership concentration increases, the largest owners gain incentives to generate private benefits not 
shared by minority shareholders. This model of the relationship between ownership concentration and 
profitability was validated by subsequent empirical studies, including Morck, Shleifer, Vishny (1989), 
Wruck (1989) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) present a similar  
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model  in  which  they  consider  the  tradeoff  between  the  benefits  of  concentrated  ownership  (better 
monitoring) and associated costs (threat of expropriation).  
Perhaps no other group of institutional investors shares as many characteristics with SWFs as do 
hedge funds. In contrast with mutual funds—which Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005) show have 
spread  around  the  world,  and  operate  fairly  similarly  everywhere--hedge  funds  are  stand-alone, 
unregulated pools of capital, managed by highly paid and incentivized investment professionals, that 
often take large stakes in publicly traded companies in order to implement corporate governance changes. 
These are the types of institutional investors that Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) predict will be ideal 
corporate monitors, and the empirical work of Klein and Zur (2006), Ferreira and Matsos (2007), Bessler 
and Holler (2008), and especially Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008) shows that hedge funds do 
create significant value for shareholders when they purchase equity stakes in under-performing companies 
and encourage (or coerce) managers to implement policy changes. Brav, et al (2008) show that hedge 
funds create far more value, and do so with far greater success, than do any other category of activist U.S. 
investors. In theory, SWFs should be able to achieve the same goals in their global investments, though 
their effectiveness may well be neutered by their perceived need to be purely passive investors to avoid 
political controversies. 
  Overall, evidence from the literature on large institutional shareholders and corporate governance 
points to likely benefits associated with ownership concentration, in particular a lower cost of capital. On 
the other hand, the same studies emphasize the dangers of excessive ownership concentration, as it can 
lead to  higher  incentives for  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders  and  bondholders  by  large  block 
holders. The present study tests whether the effect of SWF investments in companies on balance creates 
or destroys wealth by examining the initial and long-term returns to target firm shareholders subsequent 
to these investments.  
 
II.  Data and Sample Construction 
 
We draw a sample of 1,216 sovereign wealth fund investments, worth $357.1 billion, from the 
FEEM-Monitor Sovereign Wealth Fund Database. This database was organized by the Fondazione Eni-
Enrico Mattei and the Monitor Group, and covers domestic and international investments made by 28 
funds between January 1986 and September 2008. This database has been created from three sources. The 
first and most important is the set of 801 SWF investment observations, worth $260.6 billion, garnered 
from public sources by the Monitor Group. This dataset details investments in listed equity, unlisted 
equity, commercial real estate, private equity funds and joint ventures. The second source is a listing of 
230 listed and unlisted equity acquisitions, worth $71.8 billion, by pre-specified SWFs presented in the  
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Zephyr Mergers and Acquisitions database. The third source is a sample of 239 stock purchases by pre-
specified SWFs of equity issues by listed and unlisted companies, worth $84.1 billion, contained in the 
Securities Data Corporation Global New Issues database. After combining the three datasets and netting 
out the 71 observations common to two or more samples, we verified investment dates, amounts, SWF 
investors, and stakes purchased for as many observations as possible. Although the FEEM-Monitor SWF 
database  is  not  truly  comprehensive—there  are,  for  example,  no  observations  of  domestic  and 
international government or corporate bond purchases—this is by far the largest and most comprehensive 
sample of SWF investment transactions existing today. 
Table 2 summarizes the FEEM-Monitor Sovereign Wealth Fund Database and details the types of 
investments  that  SWFs  make.  These  data  debunk  the  popular  notion  that  SWFs  are  principally 
international purchasers of stock in listed western companies. Although over 90 percent (1,098 of 1,216) 
of all observations involve equity investments, only about one-third of these are investments in listed 
company equities. The remaining two-thirds involve purchases of stock in unlisted operating companies, 
private equity funds, initial public offerings, and joint ventures. The average (median) size of listed stock 
investments  is  $383  million  ($50  million),  and  this  purchases  a  mean  19.4%  (9.0%)  of  the  target 
company’s shares. The average sizes of SWF investments in unlisted operating companies and in initial 
public  offerings--$349  million  ($33  million)  and  $396  million  ($170  million,  respectively)--are 
remarkably similar both to each other and to the stakes acquired in listed firms, though funds purchase 
much larger fractions of the stock of unlisted operating companies (53.3% mean, 49.0% median) than 
they purchase in listed companies or IPOs (3.9% mean, 2.7% median). Investments in private equity 
funds are the largest investments made by sovereign funds—with a mean value of $1,905 million and a 
median  of  $1,200  million—and  in  return  funds  acquire  large  average  (59.2%)  and  median  (46.0%) 
fractions  of  the  target  private  equity  funds.  Joint  venture  investments  appear  relatively  small  ($120 
million mean and median investment, purchasing a 45.5% mean and median stake), but this should be 
viewed cautiously since only two of the eight such investments listed information on the amount or stake 
purchased. Real estate investments by sovereign funds are, on average, second only to IPO purchases in 
size ($546 million mean, $245 million median) and involve purchases of the biggest stakes (73.1% mean, 
100% median). While the typical SWF investment involves purchases of significant but minority stakes in 
target firms, fully one-third (261 of 775 observations with stake purchase values) of the deals involve 
acquisitions of majority stakes and 184 observations are purchases of 100% of the target firm’s equity. 






III.  Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns 
 
A.  Observations by fund 
Table 3 details the SWFs making the largest number and value of investments in our database. 
This table also describes the number and value of domestic investments—purchases of stakes in firms 
from the SWF’s home country.  Singaporean SWFs account for over 57% of the number and 41% of the 
value of all SWF deals, with Temasek Holdings and its subsidiary (Temasek Capital) alone accounting for 
42% of the number and 18% of the value of all deals. Other significant SWF investors include China 
Investment Company (12 deals worth $37.4 billion), the UAE’s Mubadala Development Company (62 
deals worth $30.3 billion) and Istithmar (80 deals worth $26.96 billion), the Qatar Investment Authority 
(29 deals worth $20.9 billion), the Kuwait Investment Authority (18 deals worth $19.9 billion), and the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (42 deals worth $19.1 billion). Perhaps the most surprising finding 
detailed in Table 3 is the relative infrequency of domestic investments; only 21.6% of the number and 
16.3% of the value of all deals involve SWF investments in their home countries. 
*** Insert Table 3 about here**** 
 
B.  Industrial Distribution of SWF Investments 
  Table 4 describes the industrial distribution of SWF investments. As is generally presumed to be 
the case, SWFs favor investing in companies in the financial industry over all others. The 376 financial 
firm investments account for 30.9% of all deals, by number, and over half (54.6%) of the value of all 
acquisitions.  Other significant target  industries  attracting  SWF  investments  are  real  estate (11.9%  of 
deals, 15.3% of value), information technology (7.5% of deals, 7.7% of value), industrials (9.1% of deals, 
5.3% of value), and infrastructure (11.9% of deals, 15.3% of value).  
 
C.  Target Countries for SWF Investments 
Table  4  also  presents  the  national  distribution  of  SWF  investments  (by  target  country).  The 
United States is easily the most popular target nation, with 10.9% of the number and 22.2% of the total 
value of SWF investments being channeled to US-headquartered companies, and all but one of these 
being foreign direct investments. China is the second most popular target country, though almost all of 
the  79  deals  worth  $31.0  billion  are  domestic  investments  by  the  China  Investment  Corporation—
including the $20 billion, December 2007 purchase of an equity stake in China Development Bank, which 
is the largest single investment in our database. Besides the US and China, other popular target countries 
include the United Kingdom (all foreign investments), the UAE and Singapore (mostly domestic deals), 
Australia (mostly foreign) and Malaysia (mostly domestic). Outside on investing in home-country firms,  
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it seems clear that SWFs prefer to purchase stock and real estate in the capital markets of the principal 
English common law countries—America, Britain, and Australia. 
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
 
D.  SWF Investments over time 
SWF investments, as previously discussed, have been growing rapidly in recent years. Figure 1 
graphically describes the growth in SWF investment over time. 
**** Insert Figure 1 about here **** 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
 
For our event study, we restrict the sample to purchases of shares of publicly traded firms. We 
obtain historical stock price returns adjusted for dividends and splits for targeted firms from Datastream, 
and include only observations for firms for which we find return data on Datastream for a period of at 
least  six  months  (120  trading  days)  prior  to  the  announcement  date.  Our  final  sample  contains  235 
observations. We also obtain historical equity indices for each target country from Datastream. Scores for 
SWF structure, governance, accountability and transparency and behavior come from Truman (2008).
15 
For more details on the exact scoring method, the reader is directed to Truman (2007b and 2008). The 
Linaburg-Maduell transparency index is from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.
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  We present event study results for various time intervals preceding the SWF investment in Table 
5. Results of a short-term event study around the announcement of the investment are presented in Table 
6, while results from a long-term event study following the investment are included in Table 7. In each of 
those tables, we report raw returns, market-adjusted abnormal returns and market-model abnormal returns 
for  the  common  stock  of  the  target  of  the  SWF  investment.  Market-adjusted  abnormal  returns  are 
computed by subtracting the local index return from the target’s return. Market-model abnormal returns 
are computed by subtracting the expected return obtained from a market model, using the local equity 
index as a market proxy, from the target’s return. In order to compute expected returns, we estimate the 
market model using at least 120 and as much as 360 trading days ending 20 days prior to the time interval 
                                                           
15 Truman (2007b and 2008) scores SWFs on corporate governance, and the score is based on four main questions: 
(1) is the role of the government in setting investment strategy clearly established? (2) Is the role of managers in 
executing the investment strategy clearly established? (3) Does the SWF have in place and publicly available 
guidelines for corporate responsibility? And (4) does the SWF have ethical guidelines that it follows? Truman 
(2007b and 2008) also scores SWFs on their level of accountability and transparency, structure and behavior.  
16 The Linaburg-Maduell transparency index for Sovereign Wealth Funds has been developed by Carl Linaburg and 
Micheal Maduell. Details on this index are available at: http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/transparencyindex.php  
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of interest; the exact length of the estimation interval depends on data availability. Table 8 reports results 
from a cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns.  
 
A.  Pre-Event Performance 
We limit our analysis of pre-event performance to 227 observations for which we have at least 
380 trading days of data prior to the announcement of the SWF acquisition.
17 We report compounded raw 
and abnormal returns for 240 trading days (approximately one year), 120 trading days (approximately 6 
months), 60 trading days (approximately 3 months) and 20 trading days (approximately one month) prior 
to the announcement of the acquisition.  
As reported in Table 5, volatility-weighted mean cumulative raw returns are positive over the 
240, 120 and 60 days preceding the announcement of the acquisition; nonparametric tests indicate that the 
raw returns are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. While market-adjusted abnormal returns 
are  mostly  not  statistically  significant,  market-model  volatility-weighted  mean  cumulative  abnormal 
returns are equal to -3.57% (-4.44%) over the 240 (120) days preceding the investment announcement and 
statistically significant at the 10% (1%) level. These results lead us to conclude that, on a risk adjusted 
basis, the companies in which SWFs tend to invest have on average performed poorly when compared to 
their  local  equity  indices,  consistent  with  the  proposition  that  SWFs  tend  to  invest  in  distressed 
companies.  
**** Insert Table 5 about here **** 
 
B.  Initial Market Reaction to SWF Investment Announcements 
We report short-term event study results in Table 6. We include our entire event-study sample in 
this  analysis  (235  observations).  Raw  returns,  market  adjusted  returns  and  market  model  returns  all 
indicate that the event-day (or event-window) performance is positive and statistically significant at least 
at the 10% level. In particular, market model abnormal returns over the day of the event and the following 
day are equal to 0.89%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Nonparametric tests confirm the 
statistical significance of our findings.  
**** Insert Table 6 about here **** 
There  are  two  possible  explanations  for  these  significantly  positive  announcement-period 
abnormal returns: either market participants react positively because they believe SWFs will improve 
target firm performance (a certification effect) or the large but temporary increased demand for target 
firm shares forces stock prices higher through a purely liquidity effect. We will disentangle these two 
effects in subsequent analyses.   
                                                           




C.  Long-Term Stock Price Performance After SWF Investments 
We report long-term event study results in Table 7. In particular, we report mean buy-and-hold 
and  volatility-weighted  average  cumulative  raw  and  abnormal  returns  over  the  120  trading  days 
(approximately  6  months),  240  trading  days  (approximately  one  year)  and  480  trading  days 
(approximately 2 years) following the SWF investment. For each time interval, we only include the 
observations for which we have target stock returns for the entire period. 
Mean raw returns are negative but not statistically significant over the 120 trading days following 
investment by SWFs; mean raw returns are positive and statistically significant at least at the 10% level 
for all other time intervals. Market-adjusted abnormal returns are mostly not statistically significant. 
While we report raw returns, we give most emphasis to market-model abnormal returns, as those properly 
account for the risk level of the investments. Both mean buy-and-hold and volatility-weighted mean 
cumulative market model abnormal returns are negative; the one-year market-model volatility-weighted 
mean  cumulative  abnormal  return  is  -12.52%  and  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  in  both 
parametric and nonparametric test.  The two-year, market-model, volatility-weighted mean cumulative 
abnormal return is -10.59%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level in both parametric and 
nonparametric tests. We conclude that, on a risk adjusted basis, SWF investments underperform, relative 
to local market indices.  
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
 
D.  Cross-Sectional Analysis 
We examine, within an ANOVA framework, whether 2-day, 1-year and 2-year market model 
abnormal returns differ by fund. For the 2-day event window, we use cumulative abnormal returns, while 
the longer-window abnormal returns are buy-and-hold; in all cases, we use local market equity indices as 
a proxy for market returns. Results indicate that, at the 1% significance level, short term market-model 
abnormal returns differ across funds. Results are inconclusive in regards to long-term abnormal returns. 
We do not include ANOVA tables in the present for brevity. 
In order to explain cross-sectional variations in both short-term market reactions and long-term 
target performance, we employ a series of cross-sectional regressions. We present different time horizons 
over which we compound abnormal returns: two days (the announcement day and the following day), one 
year (240 trading days following the SWF investment) and two years (480 trading days following the 
SWF investment). As response variable, we use abnormal returns computed as in the ANOVA analysis; 
we  employ  three  sets  of explanatory  variables.  In  all  regressions,  we  include  and  intercept,  Percent 
Acquired, the share of the target acquired by the SWF, and the two-month pre-event cumulative abnormal  
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return, to control for momentum. In the first set, we add the Linaburg-Maduell transparency score. In a 
second specification, we add Truman_Total, the total score given by Truman (2008), equal to the average 
of Truman’s SWF scores for structure, governance, accountability and transparency and behavior. In the 
third  model,  we  add  the  four  Truman  scores  individually,  labeled  respectively  Truman_Structure, 
Truman_Governance,  Truman_Accountability&Transparency  and  Truman_Behavior,  and  remove 
Truman_Total.  
Results in Panel A of Table 8 indicate that the two-day market reaction is not related to the share 
of the company that was acquired, to the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index, nor to Truman’s total 
score. We find that Truman’s score for accountability and transparency is marginally significant (at the 
10% significance level), but the negative sign on the coefficient is contrary to our expectations. The most 
important predictor appears to be our measure of pre-event performance. Similarly, results in Panel B 
indicate that pre-event performance is the best predictor of the one-year post-acquisition performance as 
well. Truman’s governance score is also significant at the 10% level, indicating that funds with higher 
governance are associated with better post-acquisition performance. Results in Panel C indicate that the 
two-year post-acquisition performance is not related to any of the predictors. Our cross-sectional evidence 
indicates that SWFs, rather than having a negative impact on firms in which they acquire a stake, seem to 
pick underperforming stocks which keep underperforming for at least one year following the investment.   
   **** Insert Table 8 about here **** 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
This study presents a first empirical analysis of sovereign wealth fund investment patterns and 
performance. We list the major funds and analyze their size and discuss estimates of future growth. 
Surprisingly, despite significant interest by both media and legislators, very little formal research has been 
conducted on SWFs, so we offer a review of the existing non-academic discussion, present evidence on 
the mechanics of SWF investments, and measure the impact of SWFs on the subsequent performance of 
the listed companies in which they invest. 
We document that SWFs purchase, on average, a sizable minority stake in target companies, 
which can either be publicly traded or unquoted. A large number of acquisitions are clustered in the 
finance and banking sector and SWFs tend to invest through privately negotiated transactions. SWFs also 
tend to invest in firms whose stock price has underperformed local market indices, on a risk adjusted 
basis,  over  the  previous  year.  On  average,  stocks  of  targeted  corporations  exhibit  positive  abnormal 
returns  of  about  0.9%  over  the  two  day  period  including  the  day  on  which  the  SWF  investment  is 
announced  and  the  following  day.  This  could  indicate  either  that  investors  welcome  SWFs  as  
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shareholders or the price reaction could merely be a liquidity effect resulting from a temporary—but quite 
large—increase in demand for target firm shares; we will clarify this in subsequent research.  
There are two plausible, but conflicting, theories of how SWFs could impact firm governance. On 
one hand, SWFs might act as monitors, hence improving governance and profitability. Alternatively, 
SWFs might impose goals and priorities not consistent with the maximization of firm profits, leading to 
increased agency costs and declining firm value. We analyze firm profitability, proxied by stock returns, 
over two years subsequent to the initial SWF investment and find evidence that SWFs are associated with 
deteriorating firm performance. In particular, when employing a market model, average abnormal buy-
and-hold  returns  are  -26%  over  one  year  following  the  SWF  investment,  though  our  cross-sectional 
regressions  find  no  evidence  of  a  relation  between  the  fraction  of  the  target’s  stock  acquired  and 
subsequent abnormal returns. Similarly, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between the 
governance and transparency of the SWF and its long-term impact on firm profitability. We conclude that 
SWFs invest in underperforming firms, whose underperformance persists for up to one year following the 
investment. Finally, SWFs have suffered massive—though largely unrealized as yet—losses totaling over 
$98 billion on their investments in listed companies since global stock market values first began to fall 
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Table 1. Major Sovereign Wealth Funds Listed by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008) 
 
This table lists the largest SWFs and offers information regarding country of origin (Country), fund name (Fund Name), the 
estimated fund size in US$ billions (Assets $US Billion) as of October 2008, the year in which the fund has been established 
(Inception Year), the principal source of funding for the fund (Source of Funds), and a measure of the fund’s transparency score 
(Linaburg-Maduell Transparency index), where 1=totally non-transparent and 10=totally transparent. All asset size figures quoted 
are from official sources, or, where the institutions concerned do not issue statistics of their assets, from other publicly available 





















UAE - Abu Dhabi  Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  $875  1976  Oil  3 
Saudi Arabia  SAMA Foreign Holdings  433.0  n/a  Oil  2 
China  SAFE Investment Company  311.6*  n/a  Non-Commodity  2 
Singapore  Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation  330  1981  Non-Commodity  6 
Norway  Government Pension Fund – Global  301  1990  Oil  10 
Kuwait  Kuwait Investment Authority  264.4  1953  Oil  6 
China  China Investment Corporation  200  2007  Non-Commodity  6 
Russia  National Welfare Fund  189.7**  2008  Oil  5 
China - Hong Kong  Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment 
Portfolio 
173  1998  Non-Commodity  7 
Singapore  Temasek Holdings  134  1974  Non-Commodity  8 
UAE - Dubai  Investment Corporation of Dubai  82  2006  Oil  4 
China  National Social Security Fund  74  2000  Non-commodity  5 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority  60  2003  Oil  5 
Libya  Libyan Investment Authority  50  2006  Oil  2 
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund   47  2000  Oil  1 
Australia  Australian Future Fund  43.8  2004  Non-Commodity  9 
US - Alaska  Alaska Permanent Fund  39.8  1976  Oil  10 
Kazakhstan  Kazakhstan National Fund  38  2000  Oil  n/a 
Ireland  National Pensions Reserve Fund  30.8  2001  Non-Commodity  10 
South Korea  Korea Investment Corporation  30  2005  Non-Commodity  9 
Brunei  Brunei Investment Agency  30  1983  Oil  1 
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional  25.7  1993  Non-Commodity  4 
Chile  Social and Economic Stabilization Fund  21.3  1985  Copper  7 
Canada  Alberta's Heritage Fund  16.6  1976  Oil  9 
US - New Mexico  New Mexico State Investment Office Trust  16  1958  Non-Commodity  9 
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Company  14  2006  Oil  6 
Iran  Oil Stabilisation Fund  12.9  1999  Oil  1 
Nigeria  Excess Crude Account  11  2004  Oil  1 
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund  10.2  1999  Oil  9 
UAE - Abu Dhabi  Mubadala Development Company  10  2002  Oil  7 
New Zealand   New Zealand Superannuation Fund  9.1  2003  Non-Commodity  10 
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  8.2  1980  Oil & Gas  1 
Botswana  Pula Fund  6.9  1966  Diamonds, Minerals  1 
Saudi Arabia  Public Investment Fund  5.3  2008  Oil  3 
China  China-Africa Development Fund  5.0  2007  Non-Commodity  4 
US - Wyoming  Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund  3.9  1974  Minerals  8 
East Timor  Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund  3.2  2005  Oil & Gas  6 
US - Alabama  Alabama Trust Fund  3.1  1986  Gas  6 
Trinidad & Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund  2.4  2000  Oil  5  
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Vietnam  State Capital Investment Corporation  2.1  2006  Non-Commodity  4 
UAE   Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority  1.2  2005  Oil  3 
Venezuela  FIEM  0.8  1998  Oil  1 
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund  0.4  1956  Phosphates  1 
Mauritania  National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves  0.3  2006  Oil & Gas  1 
UAE - Federal  Emirates Investment Authority  n/a  2007  Oil  1 
  Total Oil & Gas Related  $2,509       
  Total Other  $1,418       
  TOTAL  $3,927       
* This number is a best guess estimation. 




Table 2. Characteristics of the FEEM-Monitor Sovereign Wealth Fund Database 
 
This table describes the FEEM-Monitor Sovereign Wealth Fund Database and summarizes the 1,216 individual 
investments, worth $357.1 billion, made by 28 sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) between January 1986 and 
September 2008. This database has been created from three sources. The first and most important is the set of 
801 SWF investment observations, worth $260.6 billion, garnered from public sources by the Monitor Group. 
This dataset details investments in listed equity, unlisted equity, commercial real estate, private equity funds 
and joint ventures. The second source is a listing of 230 listed and unlisted equity acquisitions, worth $71.8 
billion, by pre-specified SWFs presented in the Zephyr Mergers and Acquisitions database. The third source is 
a sample of 239 equity issues by listed and unlisted companies, worth $84.1 billion, contained in the Securities 
Data Corporation Global New Issues database. After combining the three datasets and netting out the 71 
observations common to two or more samples, we verified investment dates, amounts, SWF investors, and 





Summary  Size ($US mn)  Stake acquired (%) 
























Listed equity investments  379  $141,218  $383 
 
 $50  19.4% 
 
 9.0% 
Unlisted equity investments   719  $170,659  453  $361 
[$36] 
450  52.5% 
[49.0%] 
     Unlisted operating companies  691  $154,202  442  $349 
[$33] 
440  53.3% 
[49.0%] 
     Private equity funds  10  $9,526  5  $1,905 
[$1,200] 
5  59.2% 
[46.0%] 
     Initial public offerings  7  $2,773  7  $396 
[$170] 
7  3.9% 
[2.7%] 
     Joint ventures and other  8  $145  1  $120 
[$120] 
2  45.5% 
[45.5%] 
Real estate investments  118  $45,256  83  $546 
[$245] 






Table 3: Sovereign Wealth Fund Home Country and Investment Patterns  
This table lists the number and total value (in US$ millions), by fund, of all investments, investments in domestic companies, investments in listed equity, 














































Singapore  Government Investment Corp & subs  188  $81,383  3  $408  66  $34,110  81  $31,331  41  $17,340  0  0 
Singapore  Temasek Holdings, Temsak Capital  510  65,454  159  $9,213  166  34,828  332  27,754  8  2,805  4  68 
China  China Investment Company, Ltd   12  37,350  2  $20,100  6  7,250  4  23,000  0  0  1  4,100 
United Arab Emirates  Mubadala Development Comp  62  30,279  20  $9,171  11  2,560  38  17,875  5  2,548  8  7,296 
United Arab Emirates  Istithmar  80  26,962  15  $3,972  22  5,195  37  7,110  26  14,658  1  na 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)  29  20,926  0  0  13  9,291  8  5,891  5  4,744  3  1,000 
Kuwait  Kuwait Investment Authority   17  19,878  1  na  4  6,019  10  12,963  3  896  0  0 
United Arab Emirates  Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  42  19,072  7  $51  19  14,372  19  3,565  4  1,135  0  0 
United Arab Emirates  Dubai International Capital LLC  20  11,062  4  $22  4  1,834  16  9,228  0  0  0  0 
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional Bhd  108  10,019  90  $8,398  36  6,502  65  3,260  6  137  1  120 
United Arab Emirates  Dubai International Financial Cente  11  8,858  3  na  7  8,445  3  413  1  na  0  0 
United Arab Emirates  International Petroleum Investment Corp  20  8,081  3  $1,821  5  2,413  15  5,668  0  0  0  0 
Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund  3  4,266  3  $4,266  0  0  3  4,266  0  0  0  0 
United Arab Emirates  Dubai Financial LLC  8  2,922  0  0  3  1,073  6  1,849  0  0  0  0 
United Arab Emirates  Investment Corporation of Dubai  3  2,518  1  na  1  1,504  2  1,014  0  0  0  0 
Libya  Libyan Investment Authority  44  2,101  1  na  3  125  26  330  13  438  2  1,200 
South Korea  Korea Investment Corporation  2  2,000  1  0.05  1  2,000  1  0.01  0  0  0  0 
  Others (9 funds)  49  2,604  13  $929  12  3,697  53  15,142  11  555  5  na 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5. Pre-Event Performance 
 
This table reports raw and abnormal returns for target firms prior to investments by SWFs; Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports market adjusted returns 
(computed as the difference between target’s returns and returns on a local equity index) and Panel C reports market model abnormal returns (computed as the 
difference between target’s returns and expected returns based on a market model, with a local equity index acting as a market proxy). Interval indicates the time 
interval of interest, relative to the date of the announcement of the SWF investment (day 0).  N reports the number of observations. Mean Compounded 
(Abnormal) Return reports average (abnormal) compounded returns. Volatility-Weighted Mean Compounded (Abnormal) Return reports a weighted average of 
(abnormal) compounded returns,  where the  weights are inversely proportional to the  standard error of the abnormal return. Positive and  Negative report, 
respectively, the number of positive and negative compounded (abnormal) returns for the period of interest. Patell Z reports the result of Patell’s Z-score 
computed to test the statistical significance of the mean compounded (abnormal) return relative to the period of interest. Generalized Sign Z reports the results of 
a generalized nonparametric sign test for the significance of the mean compounded (abnormal) return relative to the period of interest. Significance is denoted as 
follows: “*” indicates significance at the 0.1 level; “**” indicates significance at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
             




Cumulative Abnormal Return  Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-240,-1)  227  15.06%  14.50%  151  76  4.99  ***  7.062  *** 
(-120,-1)  226  4.61%  2.78%  125  100  1.351     3.646  *** 
(-60,-1)  225  2.64%  0.40%  126  98  0.274     3.847  ** 
(-20,-1)  225  0.41%  -0.40%  116  109  -0.481     2.501  ** 
Panel B: Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
           




Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-240,-1)  227  8.07%  2.03%  129  98  0.705     2.501  ** 
(-120,-1)  226  1.83%  -2.58%  116  110  -1.249     0.841    
(-60,-1)  225  1.77%  -0.64%  116  109  -0.439     0.907    
(-20,-1)  225  0.43%  -0.11%  116  109  -0.131     0.907    
Panel C: Market Model Abnormal Returns 
           




Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-240,-1)  227  2.18%  -3.57%  112  115  -1.805  *  0.481    
(-120,-1)  226  -1.22%  -4.44%  102  124  -3.200  ***  -0.786    
(-60,-1)  225  0.36%  -1.92%  104  121  -1.962  *  -0.457    





Table 6. Short-Term Market Reaction 
This table reports raw and abnormal short-term returns for target firms following investments by SWFs; Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports market 
adjusted returns (computed as the difference between target’s returns and returns on a local equity index) and Panel C reports market model abnormal returns 
(computed as the difference between target’s returns and expected returns based on a market model, with a local equity index acting as a market proxy). Interval 
indicates the time interval of interest, relative to the date of announcement of the SWF investment (day 0).  N reports the number of observations. Mean 
Cumulative (Abnormal) Return reports average (abnormal) cumulative returns. Volatility-Weighted Mean Compounded (Abnormal) Return reports a weighted 
average of (abnormal) cumulative returns, where the weights are inversely proportional to the standard error of the abnormal return. Positive and Negative report, 
respectively, the number of positive and negative cumulative (abnormal) returns for the period of interest. Patell Z reports the result of Patell’s Z-score computed 
to test the statistical significance of the  mean cumulative (abnormal) return relative to the period of interest. Generalized Sign Z reports the results of a 
generalized nonparametric sign test for the significance of the mean cumulative (abnormal) return relative to the period of interest. Significance is denoted as 
follows: “*” indicates significance at the .1 level; “**” indicates significance at the .05 level; “***” indicates significance at the .01 level. 
 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
             




Cumulative Abnormal Return  Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-1,+1)  235  0.95%  1.02%  131  93  3.27  ***  3.641  *** 
(0,0)  234  0.21%  0.30%  113  95  1.655  *  1.355    
(0,+1)  234  0.70%  0.88%  137  85  3.473  ***  4.496  *** 
                    Panel B: Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
           
Interval  N  Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Volatility-Weighted Mean 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Positive  Negative  Patell Z  Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-1,+1)  235  0.93%  1.02%  132  103  3.309  ***  2.451  * 
(0,0)  234  0.20%  0.34%  119  115  1.915  *  0.818    
(0,+1)  234  0.65%  0.87%  135  99  3.432  ***  2.911  *** 
                    Panel C: Market Model Abnormal Returns 
           




Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-1,+1)  235  0.89%  0.71%  132  103  3.009  ***  3.084  ** 
(0,0)  234  0.22%  0.24%  121  113  1.759  *  1.709  *  
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(0,+1)  234  0.64%  0.64%  131  103  3.328  ***  3.020  ***  
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Table 7. Long-Term Impact 
This table reports raw and abnormal long-term returns for target firms following investments by SWFs; Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports market 
adjusted returns (computed as the difference between target’s returns and returns on a local equity index) and Panel C reports market model abnormal returns 
(computed as the difference between target’s returns and expected returns based on a market model, with a local equity index acting as a market proxy). Interval 
indicates the time interval of interest, relative to the date of SWF investment (day 0).  N reports the number of observations. Mean Compounded (Abnormal) 
Return reports average (abnormal) compounded returns. Volatility-Weighted Mean Compounded (Abnormal) Return reports a weighted average of (abnormal) 
compounded returns, where the weights are inversely proportional to the standard error of the abnormal return. Positive and Negative report, respectively, the 
number of positive and negative compounded (abnormal) returns for the period of interest. Patell Z reports the result of Patell’s Z-score computed to test the 
statistical significance of the mean compounded (abnormal) return relative to the period of interest. Generalized Sign Z reports the results of a generalized 
nonparametric sign test for the significance of the mean compounded (abnormal) return relative to the period of interest. Significance is denoted as follows: “*” 
indicates significance at the .1 level; “**” indicates significance at the .05 level; “***” indicates significance at the .01 level. 
 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
             





Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(+1,+120)  219  -0.95%  -1.64%  104  115  -0.802     0.961    
(+1,+240)  182  5.33%  5.67%  95  85  1.856  *  2.42  ** 
(+1,+480)  131  42.42%  38.01%  77  53  6.892  ***  3.701  *** 
                    Panel B: Market Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
           





Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(+1,+120)  219  -2.50%  -4.89%  94  126  -2.397  *  -1.643    
(+1,+240)  182  0.53%  -2.12%  82  100  -0.651     -0.950    
(+1,+480)  131  24.81%  9.29%  62  69  1.661  *  -0.274    
                    Panel C: Market Model Abnormal Returns 
           





Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Positive  Negative  Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(+1,+120)  220  -10.99%  -7.89%  71  149  -5.087  ***  -4.169  *** 
(+1,+240)  182  -26.52%  -12.52%  66  116  -5.082  ***  -2.712  ***  
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(+1,+480)  131  -104.92%  -10.29%  48  83  -2.435  **  -2.184  **  
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Table 8. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Market-Model Abnormal Returns 
This  table  reports  results  from  OLS  regressions  of  market-model  abnormal  target  returns  (computed  as  the 
difference between target’s returns and expected returns based on a market model, with a local equity index acting 
as a market proxy) over different time horizons relative to the day of investment by a SWF; in Panel A the response 
variable  is  a  two-day  cumulative  abnormal  return  over  the  event  window  including  day  0  (the  day  of  the 
announcement  of  the  SWF  investment)  and  day  +1.  One-year  and  two-year  buy-and-hold  abnormal  returns, 
computed respectively over 240 and 480 trading days following investment by the SWF, are the response variables 
in, respectively, Panel B and Panel C. Truman_Total, Truman_Structure, Truman_Accountability&Transparancy 
and Truman_Behavior refer to the SWF-specific scores reported by Truman (2008). Percent Acquired is equal to the 
percentage of the target acquired by the SWF. 2-Month Pre-Even Cumulative Abnormal Return is the market-model 
pre-event cumulative abnormal return, included to control for momentum. N reports the number of observations and 
R-sq the R squared statistic of the regression. The table included parameter estimates and, in grey font, related 
standard  errors.  Significance  is  denoted  as  follows:  “*”  indicates  significance  at  the  .1  level  “**”  indicates 
significance  at  the  .05  level;  “***”  indicates  significance  at  the  .01  level.  [Heading  from  old;  revise  text  as 
necessary]. 
 
Panel A: Two-Day Market Model Abnormal Returns 
 
   Market-Model Abnormal Returns 
           
Intercept  0.0184  0.0290  -0.0058 
0.27  0.13  0.90 
LM - Transparency Index  -0.0011       
   0.65       
Truman – Total     -0.0005    
   0.31    
Truman – Structure        0.0009 
      0.51 
Truman – Governance        0.0011 
      0.26 
Truman -
Accountability&Transparency 
      -0.0014 
      0.08 * 
Truman – Behavior        -0.0014 
      0.28 
Percent Acquired  0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0002 
0.97  0.89  0.76 
2-Months Pre-Event Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
0.0941  0.1016  0.1023 
0.01 **  < 0.01 ***  < 0.01 *** 
           
N  130  170  170 











Panel B: One-Year Market Model Abnormal Returns 
   Market-Model Abnormal Returns 
           
Intercept  0.0738  -0.5391  -0.0556 
0.73  0.07 *  0.93 
LM - Transparency Index  -0.0464       
   0.12       
Truman – Total     0.0068    
   0.34    
Truman - Structure        -0.0163 
      0.40 
Truman - Governance        0.0300 
      0.09 * 
Truman -
Accountability&Transparency 
      -0.0146 
      0.31 
Truman - Behavior        0.0043 
      0.81 
Percent Acquired  -0.0034  -0.0027  -0.0005 
0.70  0.78  0.96 
2-Months Pre-Event Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
0.9599  1.6564  1.6789 
0.05 *  < 0.01 ***  < 0.01 *** 
           
N  130  136  136 
R-Sq (%)  4.50  7.70  9.90 
 
Panel C: Two-Years Market Model Abnormal Returns 
 
   Market-Model Abnormal Returns 
           
Intercept  -0.1429  -0.5423  -0.5190 
0.79  0.46  0.77 
LM - Transparency Index  0.0982       
   0.19       
Truman - Total     0.0252    
   0.16    
Truman - Structure        0.0128 
      0.82 
Truman - Governance        -0.0305 
      0.53 
Truman -
Accountability&Transparency 
      0.0349 
      0.37 
Truman - Behavior        -0.0250 
      0.71 
Percent Acquired  -0.0372  -0.0366  -0.0258 
0.17  0.16  0.35 
2-Months Pre-Event Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
-0.9040  -0.5841  -0.6833 
0.38  0.55  0.49 
           
N  94  99  99 




Figure 1: Temporal Distribution of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments, 1986 - September 2008 
 
These figures describe the annual number and total value (US$ Billions) of investments by sovereign 
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